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Faculty and Deans

Adulthood in Law and Culture
Vivian E. Hamilton*
Young people today come of age in a cultural and economic milieu that prolongs their
attainment of the traditional markers of adulthood. Their subjective conceptions of the
transition to adulthood also depart radically from the traditional conception, with its emphasis
on discrete transition events (including marriage and entry into the workforce). Instead, the
modern transition to adulthood is a gradual process comprising the acquisition of general
capabilities, rather than the achievement of externally constructed events. The state-established
age of legal majority stands in marked contrast to this gradual and prolonged process. Not
only does it categorically establish the inception of adult status, but states in the mid-twentieth
century adopted laws lowering statewide ages of majority from twenty-one to eighteen.
Setting legal adulthood at eighteen fails to accord with the trajectory of individual
development, the time needed to acquire the skills and education demanded of individuals in
the modern labor market, and even the social experiences of young people coming of age in
modern America. In other words, the legal construction of adulthood is starkly at odds with its
social and cultural constructions.
Moreover, we now understand that young people reliably attain different capacities at
distinct stages of development. Thus across a range of policymaking contexts, any categorical
rule will fail to take account either of context-specific capacities or deficiencies. The core
commitments of the liberal democratic state, however, require it to extend to individuals those
rights which they have attained the capacity to exercise—in other words, to recognize and
account for context-specific capacities.
An ever-growing number of exceptions to the age of majority confirms its diminishing
utility as a presumptive marker of adult capacity. Abandoning altogether the presumptive age
of legal majority in favor of context-specific rules advances the state’s liberal ends and better
aligns the legal and socio-cultural constructions of adulthood. The developmental and
behavioral sciences can and should supplement more traditional policymaking considerations.
Finally, existing law, already rife with exceptions to the age of majority, demonstrates that
context-specific decision making imposes no undue burden on lawmakers.
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The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not
disappear when an individual turns 18. . . . [H]owever, a line must be
drawn. . . . The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for
many purposes between childhood and adulthood.1
—Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005)

1.
The Roper Court went on to hold that age eighteen is “the age at which the line
for death eligibility ought to rest.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). Several
years after Roper, the Court held that juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses could not
be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
Most recently, the Court held that juveniles convicted of crimes, including murder, could not
be subjected to sentencing schemes that mandated sentences of life without the possibility of
parole. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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INTRODUCTION

The age of majority is the gateway to adult legal status,
presumptively converting legal incapacity to capacity.2 Young people
attaining adult legal status will, for example: lose the presumptive
entitlement to parental support; lose the ability to disavow contracts
due to age-based incapacity; gain the ability to participate in civic and
political life; and, if convicted of a serious-enough criminal offense,
become susceptible to sentences of life imprisonment or death.3
Today, the near universal U.S. age of majority is eighteen, but it
has historically fluctuated from the mid-teens to the mid-twenties both
here and abroad.4 Fluctuations in the age of majority have generally
accorded with changes in the nature of the capacities required of
society’s adult citizens and the age by which individuals tend to attain
those capacities.5 Historically, young people have crossed the legal—
and social—threshold to adulthood upon gaining the capacities to
perform the types of work required of a given time and place, to bear
arms and fight on behalf of the state, and/or to form and support a
family.
The U.S. age of majority was lowered from twenty-one to
eighteen, however, for reasons quite unrelated to capacity. 6 Yet
research across disciplines demonstrates that setting the age of
majority at eighteen fails to accord with the trajectory of individual
development, the time necessary to acquire the skills and abilities
demanded of individuals in the modern labor market and broader
socio-economic context, and even the social experiences of young
people coming of age in modern American culture. The legal
construction of adulthood is thus starkly at odds with the social
meaning and experiences of adulthood.
Neither raising nor lowering the age of majority will redress its
deficiencies.
Instead, individuals predictably acquire different
capabilities across the course of their development and exercise them
2.
See discussion infra subpart II.B; see also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6501 (West
1992) (“An adult is an individual who is 18 years of age or older.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-204
(2005) (“For the purposes of all [Virginia] laws . . . unless an exception is specifically
provided in this Code, a person shall be an adult, shall be of full age, and shall reach the age
of majority when he becomes 18 years of age.”); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction
of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 559 (2000) (“Currently, legal adulthood begins at
age eighteen.”).
See discussion infra subpart II.B.
3.
See discussion infra subpart II.A.
4.
5.
See discussion infra subpart II.A.
See discussion infra subpart II.A.
6.
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with varying levels of competence in different contexts.7 Thus, while
eighteen is a singularly inapt age at which to set majority across
virtually every legal context to which it applies, I argue that no
categorical age of majority can reliably capture the context-specific
acquisition of various capacities.
The inadequacy of the categorical age of majority is reflected in
the ever-growing number of exceptions to it. These exceptions aim to
adapt rules to better conform to the needs of society and capacities (or
incapacities) of young people. The exceptions have historically
tended towards extending rights to individuals younger than the age of
majority. Thus young people will have exercised many of the rights
technically reserved to adults—entering contracts, deciding medical
treatment, even marrying—long before reaching adult status.8
Increasingly, however, legal exceptions extend rules that once
applied strictly to minors to individuals past the age of majority.9 In
doing so, these exceptions to presumptive majority recognize that
most young individuals will enter adulthood unready to assume some
of the most significant attributes of their new status, such as the
financial self-sufficiency intimated by adults’ legal disentitlement to
parental support.
For most young adults, financial dependency will instead
continue well into their adult years. For the first time in over a century,
more adults aged eighteen to thirty-four live in their parents’ house
than in any other living arrangement. 10 The Federal Dependent
Coverage Mandate, part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA), is but one example of this type of legally mandated
exception. The ACA expanded the availability of health insurance for
young adults by allowing those aged nineteen to twenty-six to remain
covered as dependents under their parents’ plans.11 In doing so, it

7.
See, e.g., Paul Arshagouni, “But I’m an Adult Now . . . Sort of”: Adolescent
Consent in Health Care Decisionmaking and the Adolescent Brain, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 315, 360 (2006); see also discussion infra subpart III.C (discussing exceptions to the
age of majority).
8.
See discussion infra subpart II.C.
See discussion infra subpart II.C.5.
9.
10. Richard Fry, For First Time in Modern Era, Living with Parents Edges Out Other
Living Arrangements for 18- to 34-Year-Olds, PEW RES. CTR. 4 (May 24, 2016),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2016/05/2016-05-24_living-arrangemnet-final.pdf.
11. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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highlights the ongoing dependence that now characterizes the early
years of adulthood.12
Scholars and jurists alike have critiqued the body of law
affecting young people as lacking coherence.13 Much of the criticism
focuses on the challenges posed by attaching different legal
consequences to different ages. Our collection of laws is indeed
flawed, but these critics miss the mark. Instead, individuals acquire
different capabilities across the course of their development and
exercise them with varying levels of competence in different
contexts.14
Some scholars have argued for exceptions to the age of majority
in specific legal contexts. These arguments have included, for
example, extending the entitlement to child support15 or foster care16
beyond the age of majority and extending the right to make certain
medical or procreative decisions without adult intervention to
individuals who have not yet attained majority.17 Others have argued
against the presumption of incapacity of minors (children 18 or
adolescents19) in favor of presumed capacity, with some arguing for
the recognition of the variable capacities of minors at different ages.20
This Article diverges from earlier critiques in its call for
dismantling altogether the age of majority—thus doing away with the
conception of adulthood as a distinct legal status. The core
12. Id. The ACA, sometimes referred to as “Health Reform” or “Obamacare,” is a
major federal health reform measure aiming to make healthcare coverage universal and
affordable.
13. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing differences in the legal treatment of adolescents in the abortion and juvenile
justice contexts); Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1109-10 (2012)
(arguing that by approaching “the concept of maturity in a piecemeal and issue-specific
fashion,” the law has developed “a legal construct of maturity that is anything but consistent
or coherent”).
14. See, e.g., Arshagouni, supra note 7; see also discussion infra subpart III.C
(discussing cognitive and socio-emotional development).
15. See Monica Hof Wallace, A Federal Referendum: Extending Child Support for
Higher Education, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 665, 666 (2010).
16. See Keely A. Magyar, Betwixt and Between but Being Booted Nonetheless: A
Developmental Perspective on Aging Out of Foster Care, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 557, 558 (2006).
17. See J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Shifting Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal Culpability
and the Indeterminate Legal Status of Adolescents, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 91 (2003).
18. See Hillary Rodham, Children’s Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21, 33 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds.,
1979); Henry H. Foster & Doris Jonas Freed, Needed: A Bill of Rights for Children,
STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1973, at 22, 55.
19. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless
Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1362 (2000).
20. See Rodham, supra note 18; Foster & Freed, supra note 18.
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commitments of the liberal democratic state require extending to
individuals the right to exercise those self-regarding capacities of
which they are capable. That end calls for adopting context-specific
rules informed by insights from the social and developmental sciences,
which can help explain the development of capabilities and their
exercise in different contexts.
Jettisoning the presumptive age of majority in law would have
the secondary benefit of eroding what has become the cultural
archetype of adulthood. Studies have revealed that young people
conceive of the adult status as a state of individualism and
independence. 21 It is a normative construction that not only
undermines the importance of community but is also markedly
incongruent with the ongoing dependence typical of today’s young
adults.
Part II sets the age of majority in historical and legal contexts.
Insights from social history and anthropology help explain cultural
and structural factors that influence adult status and the conception of
adulthood. This Part thus describes the legal construction of
adulthood and how the line between minority and adulthood came to
be drawn at age eighteen. It demonstrates that setting the age of
majority at eighteen was an ill-conceived move set in motion by the
wartime need to lower the draft age and facilitated by what was a
subsequent historical aberration—the rapid transition to adulthood
that occurred during a postwar industrial economy that enabled young
people with few skills to earn high wages, thereby enabling them to
marry and establish households at young ages.
The legal construction of adult status is starkly at odds with the
modern social meaning and experiences of adulthood. Part III
provides a social history of the transition to adulthood and describes
the sociocultural construction of modern adulthood. Young people
today conceive of adulthood differently than they have in the past.
They come of age in a cultural and economic context that prolongs
their achievement of certain traditional markers of adulthood. For
example, in a service-based postindustrial economy, the vast majority
of well-paying jobs require some postsecondary education or training.
Individuals achieve financial independence, marriage, and parenthood
a full decade or more after reaching legal adult status. Along with
insights from the developmental sciences into relevant aspects of
development from adolescence through early adulthood, this survey
21.

See discussion infra Part IV.
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makes plain the incongruence between adult status as constructed by
U.S. law and adult status as conceptualized and experienced by
individuals.
Part IV argues that the disjunction between social and legal
constructions of adulthood harms individuals and contravenes the
core commitments of the liberal democratic state. It proposes that
lawmakers implement fully what they have already begun to
implement piecemeal—abandoning the presumptive age of legal
majority and adopting legal rules that account for the context-specific
acquisition of capabilities. It argues that today’s lawmakers would be
remiss to ignore relevant and readily available research across the
social and developmental sciences, in addition to more traditional
policy considerations. Indeed, some legislators, jurists, and legal
scholars have begun to consider the implications of some of this
research.22
The age of majority is a construct that has quite lost any social or
legal utility it may have once had, and it should thus be abandoned.
The remainder of this Article examines it, details its flaws, and
proposes a principled and pragmatic alternative to it.
II.

THE LEGALLY CONSTRUCTED STATUS OF ADULTHOOD

Sir Henry Maine’s observation about the movement away from
status in progressive societies may hold true as a general matter across
legal realms, but counterexamples abound.23 In law, “status” denotes a
group sharing some set of attributes that justifies its membership
being governed by a common set of rules.24 Legal statuses can thus
facilitate the efficient functioning of a complex society. “Corporation,”
22. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (holding unconstitutional
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by an offender younger than age
eighteen). Almost entirely ignored, however, though particularly useful in the legislative
contexts which are this Article’s primary focus, are the contributions of behavioral decision
research. This research offers a framework and methods for studying and assessing decisionmaking competence and accounts for both individual and situational variability. Baruch
Fischhoff, Assessing Adolescent Decision-Making Competence, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV.
12, 13 (2008).
23. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (5th ed. 1873) (“[T]he
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract.”); see also Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
31, 38-41 (2006) (discussing the resistance to change of certain aspects of the marital status).
24. “Status” in the legal context is defined as “[t]he fact or position of belonging to a
group which is subject to certain legal rights or limitations.” Status, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2012).
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“marriage,” and “minor,” for example, are all legal statuses defined
and governed by distinct sets of legal rules. “Adult” is another.
Like the law generally, statuses shape and are shaped over time
by social forces. Their meanings can be at once legally and socially
constructed, and they thus evolve along with changing social
circumstances. The status of “wife,” for example, once comprised the
near total legal incapacity imposed by the doctrine of coverture.25
Social pressure led to the revising of the status through the repeal of
coverture with states’ adoption of Married Women’s Property Acts and
eventually to the formal equality of wives and husbands.26
Childhood and adulthood are also socially and legally
constructed statuses whose meanings have varied dramatically over
time and across cultures. 27 Despite what may appear to be the
inevitability of our current binary classification system, in which
individuals are either minors or adults, the progression from
childhood to adulthood is fluid and not readily amenable to biological
definition.28 Instead, structural (e.g., legal and economic norms) and
cultural (e.g., social norms) changes have influenced the course and
timing of individuals’ transitions to adulthood.
The age of majority has historically fluctuated depending on the
capacities required of adults at different times and places. It has also
varied according to the capacities required of different social roles that
young individuals were destined to fill. In Medieval England, for
example, the age of majority for English males destined for the
military status of knighthood was twenty-one, before which they
would not have completed the training nor gained the strength
required of them. However, young men destined for agricultural life
attained adult status at the significantly younger age of fifteen, by
which they would have gained the capacity to engage in agricultural
25. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 10-12
(2000).
26. See, e.g., NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 158-59 (1982). Marital status itself,
moreover, continues to evolve, most recently when the Supreme Court held that same-sex
couples have a constitutional right to marry. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2608 (2015).
27. See, e.g., BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE
TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE 26 (2008) (“The
timing of transition from childhood to adulthood is strongly influenced by issues of class and
culture as well as by issues of race and gender.”); Annette Ruth Appell, The Pre-Political
Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 703, 706 (2009) (arguing that
childhood is a “socially constructed category deeply connected to race, gender, class, and
citizenship”).
28. See Scott, supra note 2, at 548.
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work.29 The following subparts survey the historical evolution of the
legal age of majority, significant aspects of the modern construction
of the legal status, and exceptions to that presumptive legal status.

A. The Age of Majority: A Brief History
Early Roman law set the age of majority at the age by which
individuals would presumably have attained the intellectual capacities
required to exercise full citizenship, manage their affairs, and become
parents and the heads of families themselves—age fifteen for males.30
But while the onset of puberty may have signaled the physical
capacity to become parents, the Romans apparently believed that it
failed to coincide with young males’ attainment of full intellectual
maturity. Accordingly, Roman law placed free males who were
technically “of full years and rights” under the temporary
guardianship of adults known as Curatores.31 A Curator’s approval
was required to validate young males’ formal acts or contracts until
they reached twenty-five years of age.32 Indeed, Roman law used the
terms “minority” and “majority” in reference, not to age fifteen, but
instead to age twenty-five—the age of plenam maturitatem, or full
maturity.33
Throughout other parts of Europe, the attainment of physical
capacity—particularly the ability to participate in warfare—
determined legal maturity.34 The age of majority between the ninth
and eleventh centuries was fifteen for males.35 When the nature of
warfare changed during the Middle Ages so did the age of majority.36
The increasing weight of defensive armor and growing use of
mounted cavalry required both greater strength and skill on the part of
the English knights who fought on behalf of the crown.37 The age of
29. T.E. James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 22, 30 (1960).
30. MAINE, supra note 23, at 155; James, supra note 29, at 25.
31. MAINE, supra note 23, at 156.
32. Id. at 156-57.
33. Id. at 156; James, supra note 29, at 33.
34. James, supra note 29, at 25. The age of majority freed an individual from the
wardship or tutelage of his adult guardian, entitled him to marry, and required him to claim
his inheritance. Id. at 30-31.
35. Id. at 24-25. Historians have noted that, while fifteen was the age of majority in
ninth- and tenth-century France, Germany, and northern Europe, there is no “clear authority”
that it was also the English age of majority during that time. They consider it reasonable to
assume, however, that it was. Id. at 26-27.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 27; see also 2 WM. A. SHAW, THE KNIGHTS OF ENGLAND (1906) (listing
knights by year in which they were dubbed).
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eligibility for knighthood (the equivalent of the age of majority at the
time) increased to twenty-one, by which age young men would have
gained the strength and completed the training required of those who
fought in the heavy cavalry.38
Not all English males were destined for the honor of military
tenure. Socage tenure, for example, was an agricultural status held by
tenants who worked the land of feudal lords to whom they owed rent.39
The requisite capacities for those who held this status were the
abilities to farm and conduct their “rustic employs.”40 The age of
majority for socage tenants seems to have originally been fourteen,
though it was later raised to fifteen by local custom.41
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the age required for the elite status of
knighthood was the age whose imprint would endure.42 English
historical and common law traditions became law throughout the
British Commonwealth.43 Twenty-one remained the age of majority
for centuries in England, as well as throughout much of the Western
world and nations that incorporated English traditions.44
The immediate historical origins of the U.S. age of majority lie
in the English common law tradition.45 The American colonies, then
the United States, adopted age twenty-one as the near universal age of
majority.46 The U.S. age of majority remained unchanged from the
country’s founding well into the twentieth century. In 1942 wartime
needs prompted Congress to lower the age of conscription from
twenty-one to eighteen, a change that would eventually lead to the
lowering of the age of majority generally.47
For a period of years following the lowering of the draft age to
eighteen, the voting age (and the general age of majority) remained
twenty-one. The obligation of military service, however, has long
38. See James, supra note 29, at 28.
39. Id. at 30.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 29-30.
42. Id. at 33.
43. See WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH’S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: A HISTORY OF
VOTING AGE IN AMERICA 72 (1992).
44. James, supra note 29, at 22, 33.
45. See id. at 25-26.
46. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
UNDER THE LAW 248 (2004).
47. See CULTICE, supra note 43, at 7, 20; see also Vivian E. Hamilton, Democratic
Inclusion, Cognitive Development, and the Age of Electoral Majority, 77 BROOK. L. REV.
1447, 1461-62 (2012) [hereinafter Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion] (discussing the influence
of the Second World War on public sentiment and Congress’ initiative to lower the voting
age to eighteen).
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been linked to the right to political participation. 48 Thus
Congressional debates to subject eighteen-year-olds to the draft were
soon followed by proposals to also extend to eighteen-year-olds the
right to vote.49 These proposals led to the eventual passage of the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1971, lowering the voting age to
eighteen in both state and federal elections.50
Once eighteen had become the age of conscription and of the
franchise, it began to replace twenty-one across a range of contexts
and has been adopted as the near universal age of majority.51 Fortyfour states have adopted eighteen as the presumptive age of legal
majority.52 Six have set their ages of majority higher, with five states
setting it at nineteen and one at twenty-one.53
Eighteen has thus become firmly entrenched as the presumptive
age of majority, replacing in just a few decades its centuries-old
predecessor. Its widespread adoption notably reflected a desire for a
certain sort of consistency rather than a widely held consensus that
young people reached maturity or generally attained adult-like
capabilities before age twenty-one.
The impetus for lowering the age of majority, of course, was the
immediate need for large numbers of soldiers to participate in U.S.
wartime efforts. Although having less to do with maturity of
judgment than with physical maturity, other age-based limitations
previously imposed on young people between eighteen and twenty fell
alongside the age of conscription. The following subpart briefly
describes some of the more significant of the legal changes that
currently accompany the attainment of the age of majority.54
48. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 19 (2005) (“In
classic republican theory, the rights of collective self-government stood shoulder to shoulder
with the responsibilities of collective self-defense.”); see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT
TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (2000).
49. CULTICE, supra note 43, at 22.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens . . . eighteen years of age
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of age.”).
51. Termination of Support—Age of Majority, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/termination-of-child-support-age-of-majority.
aspx (last updated Mar. 2015) (listing statutory citations for the ages of majority of each U.S.
state and territory).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. For more exhaustive discussions of the effects of majority, see Larry
Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of
Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 285-364
(2006); Todres, supra note 13, at 1121-41.
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Legal Effects of Majority: An Overview

Today, the legal age of majority reflects a presumption that
typical individuals of that age are “mature enough to function in
society as adults, to care for themselves, and to make their own selfinterested decisions.”55 Every state has adopted a legal age of majority
through various legislative or judicial measures.56
Designated statutory provisions establishing statewide ages of
majority, for example, generally provide that upon reaching the
established age, a person “shall be an adult for all purposes
whatsoever and have the same legal capacity, rights, powers,
privileges, duties, liabilities and responsibilities.”57 Some states have
adopted an age of majority indirectly, usually through statutory
provisions that establish the age at which parents’ duty of support
presumptively terminates. 58 Finally, common and statutory law
frequently address more directly other age-related laws—both those
that comport with the age of majority and those that act as exceptions
to it. The following subparts briefly identify some of the more
significant of the civil effects that attend the age of majority.
1.

Disentitlement to Parental and/or State Support

There is a strong presumption that a young person’s entitlement
to parental support ends at majority, generally age eighteen.59 A
number of states allow the extension of support orders past eighteen if
a child is enrolled in but has not yet graduated from high school.60
Similarly, young people presumptively age out of foster care
once they turn eighteen or, in some states, nineteen.61 Some states
provide for continuing foster care past age eighteen when the young
person is enrolled in some sort of educational or rehabilitative
program.62 Others give their courts discretion to determine whether to
55. Scott, supra note 2.
56. See, e.g., id.
57. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1d (2015) (lowering the statewide age of
majority from twenty-one to eighteen).
58. See, e.g., id.
59. Termination of Support—Age of Majority, supra note 51. Forty-four states set
the age of majority at eighteen. Id.
60. See, e.g., id. For example, twenty-four states will allow the extension of support
orders to age nineteen if certain conditions are met; some other states permit extensions
beyond nineteen. Id.
61. See Magyar, supra note 16, at 564-73.
62. The states include Arkansas, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306(a)(1)(B)(ii)
(2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-93(1) (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 23(f) (2016); 42
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continue state custody past age eighteen based on factors that can
include the young person’s best interests or need for services.63 Only a
few states’ statutes explicitly provide for retaining custody for the
purpose of helping a young person successfully transition to
independence.64 Dedicated federal funds exist to help states provide
foster care only to individuals younger than eighteen and eighteenyear-olds enrolled in high school who will likely graduate before their
nineteenth birthdays.65
By ending parental and state support obligations at majority, the
law treats those who are aged eighteen and over or who have
completed a high school education as capable of financial
independence and responsible for their own financial support.66 A
high school education may in previous decades have enabled financial
self-sufficiency, but as Part IV demonstrates, high school alone rarely
suffices. In the modern economy, well-paying jobs providing the
opportunity for middle-class living typically require postsecondary
education or training.67 The legal effects of the age of majority
operate to leave high school graduates without parental support before
allowing them a sufficient opportunity to attain financial security. In
doing so, the age of majority both disserves young people and
ineffectively meets the workforce needs of the employers that drive
the nation’s economy.

PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-510(B) (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 26-6-6.1 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(b)(5)(G) (2016).
63. These states include Alaska, Illinois, Iowa, and New Jersey. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.10.080(c)(1)(B) (2015); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-31(1) (1987); IOWA CODE
§ 232.102(1)(b) (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-2.3 (West 2016).
64. These states include Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, and New Jersey. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-521.01(A)-(B) (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2016);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.140(1)(d) (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-2.3 (West
2016).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 608a, 619(2)(B), 672 (2012). The Foster Care Independence Act
(FCIA) permits states to use federal money to fund independent living programs for young
people aged eighteen to twenty-one. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-169, § 121, 113 Stat. 1822, 1829-30 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(w)).
Only about half of young people between eighteen and twenty-one are eligible for the room
and board allotment provided by the statute, which totals just over $1400 annually per
individual. See Magyar, supra note 16, at 563; Cynthia Andrews Scarcella et al., The Cost of
Protecting Vulnerable Children IV: How Child Welfare Funding Fared During the
Recession, URBAN INST. 16-18 (2004), http://www.urban.org/research/publication/costprotecting-vulnerable-children-iv (select “Download PDF”).
66. The law in just under half of the states assumes that financial dependence will
end, not necessarily at age eighteen, but instead upon the young person’s graduation from
high school. Magyar, supra note 16, at 564.
67. See discussion infra subpart IV.C.
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Freedom from Parental Authority

Legal adults gain independence from parental authority. During
their children’s minority, parents have not only a legally enforceable
obligation to provide for the support of their children; they also have a
constitutional right to the “custody and control” of their children.68
“Custody and control” encompasses the ability to make all manner of
decisions on their behalf.69
The state exercises its parens patriae power to enact regulations
that interfere with parental authority in areas including education and
public health.70 Otherwise, the state generally defers to parents’ childrearing practices so long as their caregiving does not fall to a level that
would constitute statutorily defined abuse or neglect.71
Parents’ day-to-day authority over their children is thus
universally acknowledged and respected; at the same time, its
contours are rarely formally defined. Parents decide where their
children will live, where they will attend school, which doctors will
attend them, which medical procedures they will undergo, and every
aspect of how they will be raised—their daily schedules, activities,
diets, etc. Once an individual is identified as a parent, community
actors such as school officials and health care providers afford them
the decision-making authority that attend that status.72

68. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding
unconstitutional state legislation requiring that all children be educated in public schools and
recognizing parents’ rights “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (holding unconstitutional state
legislation restricting the teaching of foreign languages in elementary schools and
recognizing parents’ rights to “establish a home and bring up children”).
69. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding
unconstitutional a state third-party visitation statute that permitted any person to petition a
court for visitation with a child at any time because the statute “failed to accord the
determination of . . . a fit custodial parent[] any material weight”). The plurality in Troxel
stated “that the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to
‘establish a home and bring up children’ and . . . ‘to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.’” Id. at 65-66 (first quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; then
quoting Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35).
70. See, e.g., Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534 (noting “the power of the State
reasonably to regulate all schools [and] to require that all children of proper age attend some
school”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (observing that “the state may do much, go very far,
indeed” to advance the general welfare infringing upon parents’ rights).
71. See Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville,
2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 287-96 (arguing in favor of state noninterference in parenting
generally).
72. A notable exception exists in the case of noncustodial parents, in which case a
biological parent’s authority may be limited by judicial decree.
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Just as many aspects of the parent’s authority tend to exist
informally, its technical cessation once a child reaches the age of
majority also tends to occur informally. However, two legal
doctrines—invoked, ironically, when there is a failure or absence of
presumptive parental authority—help delineate the contours of
parental authority.
The first is the doctrine of emancipation, which confers upon a
minor “the rights, duties, privileges, and responsibilities provided by
the civil law to a person who has reached the age of majority under
civil law.”73 Generally, minors found to be living independent of their
parents and supporting themselves may be declared emancipated.74
Most states provide for some form of emancipation through either
statutory or common law.75 However, not all states have formally
adopted the doctrine, and some that have done so provide only a
limited array of rights to emancipated minors.76 Certain transition
events most commonly appear as justification for a child’s
emancipation—the child’s marriage, pregnancy, or military service.77
The rights of emancipated minors typically allow them to enter
contracts (such as lease agreements), receive certain forms of public
assistance usually reserved to heads of household, and retain their own
earnings.78 Emancipation also relieves parents of the duty to support
the minor child.79
The second legal mechanism, the ungovernability action, permits
parents to initiate a judicial action seeking to have a minor child found
“ungovernable.”80 A minor may be brought under court supervision if
73. HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-25 (2015). See generally Carol Sanger & Eleanor
Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 239 (1992) (describing the legal processes by which minors may become
emancipated).
74. See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 73, at 240.
75. See id. at 240-41.
76. See Bethany Stasiak, Statutory and Judicial Emancipation of Minors in the
United States, BOS. COOP NETWORK (2002), http://bostoncoop.net/lcd/emancipation/
emancipation_deliverable.pdf.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN., § 38-102 (2015) (providing only for the minor’s right
to enter contracts, including those involving real and personal property); WIS. STAT. § 48.987
(2015) (providing that a self-supporting minor is entitled to his or her own earnings); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.5 (2016) (providing for the granting of public
assistance to eligible emancipated minors).
79. See William E. Dean, Note, Ireland v. Ireland: Judicial Emancipation of Minors
in Idaho: Protecting the Best Interests of the Child or Conferring a Windfall upon the Parent?,
31 IDAHO L. REV. 205, 215 (1994).
80. See generally Randy Frances Kandel & Anne Griffiths, Reconfiguring
Personhood: From Ungovernability to Parent Adolescent Autonomy Conflict Actions, 53
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the minor is found to be a “habitual truant or is incorrigible,
ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control
of his or her parents, guardian or lawful custodian.”81 State statutes
adopt intentionally vague standards under which a young person’s
actions, albeit lawful but which violate the parents’ mores and
expectations, may justify a court’s determination that the youth should
be in the custody of a social services department for placement and
treatment in a foster home or other institution.82 These actions can
include engaging in sexual relationships over parents’ objections,
being truant from school, violating curfews, and general
disobedience.83
Emancipated minors step into the shoes of their parents,
exercising for themselves the authority that parents would normally
exercise over them. Parents who successfully have a child adjudicated
ungovernable allow the state, at least temporarily, to substitute its
parens patriae power for parental control. Ungovernability actions
illustrate the sort of authority parents are entitled to exercise over their
children and with which children are expected to comply. Even if a
child’s actions stop short of criminal or delinquent behavior—such as
general noncompliance with parents’ wishes—the state may act to
reinforce parental authority.
Thus both emancipation and
ungovernability actions help illustrate the scope of parental authority.
3.

Contract Rights

On reaching the age of majority, individuals may disaffirm
contracts entered during their minority.84 The common law has for
centuries provided minors this protection, known as the infancy
defense or infancy doctrine.85 The infancy doctrine has historically
existed to protect young people from squandering their wealth or from
falling prey to unscrupulous adults who would take advantage of their
inexperience in the marketplace.86 Disaffirmance does not generally
SYRACUSE L. REV. 995 (2003) (describing and critiquing the ungovernability action as a
means of resolving parent-child conflict and proposing in its stead a form of civil action that
prioritizes not only parental decision-making rights but also adolescent autonomy rights).
81. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 732 (McKinney 2010).
82. Kandel & Griffiths, supra note 80, at 997.
83. Id.
84. 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 27.2 (rev. ed. 2002); 5 SAMUEL
WILLISTON & RICHARD LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 9:3-:5 (4th ed.
1993).
85. See 5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 84, § 9:2.
86. Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the “Infancy Law Doctrine”:
From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 481 n.3 (1995).
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permit the rescinding individual to reap the benefit of the voided
contract. Instead, each party generally must return to the other any
consideration given.87
A 2009 federal statute, the Credit Card Accountability,
Responsibility, and Disclosure Act (CARD Act), goes further than the
infancy doctrine in providing protection to minors.88 The CARD Act
prohibits any contract for a credit card entered by an individual
younger than twenty-one unless one of two exceptions apply: (1) an
adult twenty-one years or older cosigns and accepts joint liability for
any debt incurred pursuant to the contract; or (2) the individual
demonstrates “independent means of repaying” any debt incurred.89
Common and statutory law have both created several exceptions
to the infancy defense.90 One of these exceptions prevents the later
disaffirmance of contracts that provide minors the “necessaries of
life.”91 Thus when minors purchase basic necessities, the exception
aims to counteract one of the potential drawbacks of the infancy
defense—merchants’ unwillingness to conduct business with minors
for fear of later disaffirmance.92 Other statutorily created exceptions
prohibit the disaffirmance of certain types of contracts where
legislatures deemed finality and certainty to outweigh the right of
disaffirmance. 93 These exceptions commonly include insurance
contracts, child support agreements, and student loans.94

87. 7 PERILLO, supra note 84, § 27.6. The common law imposed no duty on the
minor to return consideration or goods no longer in the minor’s possession. Modern courts,
however, have been more willing to require minors to make restitution to the adult
contracting party in such circumstances. Id.
88. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-24, § 301, 123 Stat. 1734, 1747-48 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c) (2012)).
89. Id. For a critique of the CARD Act, see Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough To

Fight, Old Enough To Swipe: A Critique of the Infancy Rule in the Federal Credit CARD
Act, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 407. Schwartz argues that the Act’s provisions “run[] badly afoul of
th[e] broad societal consensus [that eighteen-year-olds are adults], roll[] back the clock to
medieval times, and undermine[] the dignity of eighteen-year-olds.” Id. at 408. He also
argues that because the Act makes credit more difficult for young people to obtain, it stifles
youthful entrepreneurship and thus deprives society of the potential benefits of these
ventures. Id.
90. 7 PERILLO, supra note 84, § 27.8; 5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 84, § 9:18;
DiMatteo, supra note 86, at 488-89.
91. Sources cited supra note 90.
92. Irving M. Mehler, Infant Contractual Responsibility: A Time for Reappraisal and
Realistic Adjustment?, 11 U. KAN. L. REV. 361, 364-65 (1963).
93. DiMatteo, supra note 86, at 483 n.10.
94. 7 PERILLO, supra note 84, § 27.3; 5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 84, § 9:6;
DiMatteo, supra note 86, at 513.
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It is only once individuals enter adulthood that merchants may
transact business with them without fear of disaffirmance. Yet the
threat of disaffirmance does little to dissuade merchants or hinder
minors from conducting business. Minors are instead active and
significant participants in the marketplace, as both consumers and
sellers. Market research into a single year of their economic activity
estimated that minors spent nearly $190 billion in economic
transactions and estimated their spending to increase to nearly $209
billion by 2011, despite a projected 3% decline in teen population.95
Scholars observe that teens’ spending power, particularly through
increasing online spending in which they can participate in economic
activity in virtual anonymity, gives minors “the potential to cause
serious economic consequences to online businesses by disaffirming
contracts in droves.”96 Yet there is scant evidence of any impending
economic calamity.
While the right to contract is regularly touted as one of the rights
of adulthood, it is in reality a right that is regularly exercised by
minors. This regular involvement in market transactions arguably
renders the right to contract an almost-irrelevant marker of the
transition to adult status. Indeed, for decades, both scholars and
jurists have been calling for the doctrine’s overhaul or outright
repeal.97
Critics of the infancy doctrine argue that adolescents have
sufficient capacity to enter contracts to which they should be held.
The doctrine may have the perverse effect of permitting market-savvy
individuals to later disavow contracts that they were sufficiently
capable to enter as minors.98 More recently, commentators have
pointed to the growing body of developmental research tending to
confirm the cognitive capacity of adolescents to enter contracts.99 To
95. Vahe Habeshian, By 2011, Teen Market Shrinks, Spending Clout Soars to
$200B, MARKETINGPROFS (June 29, 2007), http://www.marketingprofs.com/opinions/2007/
19516/by-2011-teen-market-shrinks-spending-clout-soars-to-200b; Teen Market To Surpass
$200 Billion by 2011, Despite Population Decline, MARKETINGCHARTS (June 28, 2007),
http://www.marketingcharts.com/traditional/teen-market-to-surpass-200-billion-by-2011despite-population-decline-817/.
96. Cheryl B. Preston, CyberInfants, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 225, 268 (2012).
97. See, e.g., Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968)
(acknowledging the defects of the infancy doctrine but suggesting that the legislature was the
proper branch to alter the doctrine rather than the court); DiMatteo, supra note 86, at 518;
Mehler, supra note 92, at 364.
98. DiMatteo, supra note 86, at 485.
99. See, e.g., Michael Glassman & Donna Karno, On Establishing a Housing Right
of Contract for Homeless Youth in America, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 437, 453 (2009)
(“The suggestion that youth under fifteen are not capable of understanding the social contract
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the extent the infancy doctrine flies in the face of social reality,
provides unneeded protection to (at least a subset of) minors, and
contravenes the core moral underpinning of contract law itself—the
keeping of promises—it is ripe for revision.100
4.

The Right to Full Labor Market Participation

Federal and state laws impose restrictions on the types and hours
of employment in which individuals younger than eighteen may
engage. Federal law, through the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
curtails the employment of individuals younger than sixteen, but it
imposes relatively few restrictions on the employment of those aged
sixteen and older.101 The FLSA instead leaves sixteen- and seventeenyear-olds largely free to engage in paid employment in nonhazardous
occupations.102 Many states, however, have adopted measures that
extend greater protections to older teens with the goal of preventing
their paid work from interfering with their health or education. These
measures generally impose limits on the number of hours sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds may work.103 Once workers reach age eighteen,
they are no longer subject to these special protections.
The provisions of the FLSA and other labor regulations that free
individuals from restrictions on their employment upon reaching the
age of majority roughly correspond with the completion of high
school. As noted above and discussed more fully below, economic
changes have made postsecondary education increasingly necessary
to obtaining middle-class income. Due to increases in the costs of
that education and parents’ unwillingness or inability to provide
ongoing financial support, more students today than in recent decades
find it necessary to work either full- or part-time while enrolled in
school.104
is not supported by developmental research . . . .”); Cunningham, supra note 54, at 292
(noting the absence of “effort to change the infancy doctrine despite criticism from
academics and even courts [and] despite the . . . widespread agreement among psychologists
that children’s cognitive abilities develop at a far earlier age than originally thought”).
100. See Cunningham, supra note 54, at 293-94; Hartman, supra note 19, at 1303-04.
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-07, 212 (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 570.2(a) (2011). Federal
regulations prohibit the employment of all individuals under eighteen in hazardous
occupations. 29 C.F.R. § 570.2(a)(1)(ii); see also 29 C.F.R. § 570.50-.68 (listing hazardous
occupations).
102. The Act imposes no work hour restrictions on individuals aged sixteen and over.
29 C.F.R. §§ 570.2(a)(1)(i), .35, .70(a).
103. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 143 (McKinney 2016).
104. Anne H. Gauthier & Frank F. Furstenberg Jr., Historical Trends in Patterns of
Time Use Among Young Adults in Developed Countries, in ON THE FRONTIER OF
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It is regrettable that the difficulty of financing postsecondary
education requires many students to combine work and school,
increasing the length of time required to complete their educations
and obtain desirable employment. Ameliorating this difficulty might
entail any number of policy revisions. Those efforts arguably ought
not occur, however, by way of revisions to existing labor protections.
5.

The Right to Political and Civic Participation

With few exceptions, individuals acquire the rights and duties of
political and civic participation at age eighteen. The national voting
age is eighteen.105 States have the authority to set the voting age lower,
but the Twenty-Sixth Amendment prevents their setting it higher.106
Some states permit seventeen-year-olds to vote in primary elections if
they will turn eighteen by the general election, but no state has chosen
to allow individuals younger than eighteen to vote.107 There has been a
global move to lower the voting age, as well as scattered efforts in
several U.S. states and municipalities to do so.108 To date, only one
municipality—the city of Takoma Park, Maryland has enacted
legislation lowering the voting age to sixteen for local elections.109
The national age for draft eligibility and voluntary enlistment in
any of the branches of the military absent parental consent is
eighteen.110 Individuals who obtain parental consent may voluntarily
enlist at seventeen.111
The age at which individuals become eligible to sit on federal
juries is eighteen, lowered from twenty-one in 1972 by amendment to
the federal Jury Selection and Service Act.112 In the states, there is
ADULTHOOD: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 150, 159 (Richard A. Settersten Jr. et
al. eds., 2005).
105. See Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, supra note 47, at 1448.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States, who
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of age.”).
107. See 17-Year-Old Primary Voting, FAIRVOTE, http://archive3.fairvote.org/reforms/
universal-voter-registration/17-year-old-primary-voting-2/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2016).
108. See Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, supra note 47, at 1465-74 (listing nations
that have already lowered the voting age and those with pending efforts to do so).
109 Lindsay A. Powers, Takoma Park Grants 16-Year-Olds Right to Vote, WASH.
POST (May 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/takoma-park-grants-16-yearolds-right-to-vote/2013/05/14/b27c52c4-bccd-11e2-89c9-3be8095fe767_story.html.
110. 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2012).
111. Id.
112. Act of Apr. 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-269, 86 Stat. 117 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1865(b)(1) (1970)) (setting the age of eligibility to serve on federal grand or petit juries at
twenty-one).
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only slightly more variation in the age of jury eligibility, and these
closely track the states’ respective ages of majority.113 Thus, the near
universal age at which individuals become eligible for jury service is
eighteen (in forty-six states and the District of Columbia);114 the age
for jury service eligibility is nineteen in two states115 and twenty-one in
two other states.116
Although individuals acquire most rights to civic and political
participation upon reaching the age of majority, it is not unusual for
governments to impose separate age requirements on holders of
various state and federal offices. Both federal and state constitutional
provisions require individuals to meet higher age requirements in
order to qualify to hold certain offices.117
6.

The Right to Medical and Procreative Choice

The authority to make medical decisions affecting minors
presumptively rests with their parents.118 Only upon reaching the age
of majority are individuals categorically entitled to make their own
medical decisions. 119 Minors may consent to treatment in some
circumstances, including in cases of emergency, in cases involving
reproductive health care (such as contraceptive services, prenatal care,
and examination and treatment for sexual assault and sexually
transmitted diseases), and in cases involving mental health care
(which extends to outpatient substance abuse and mental health
treatment).120
113. Compare Termination of Support—Age of Majority, supra note 51 (providing
age of majority of individual states), with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (giving
jury qualification age for individual states).
114. Roper, 543 U.S. 551 app. (listing minimum age for jury service in forty-eight
states and the District of Columbia); OR. REV. STAT. § 10.030(2)(c) (2009); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 4502 (2016).
115. ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a)(1) (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601(1) (2015).
116. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 494.425(1) (2015).
117. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I.
118. B. Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making by and on Behalf of Adolescents:
Reconsidering First Principles, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 37, 38 (2012); Kimberly M.
Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-Making
Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 259 (2005).
119. David M. Vukadinovich, Minors’ Rights To Consent to Treatment: Navigating
the Complexity of State Laws, 37 J. HEALTH L. 667, 667-68 (2004) (“While the law is clear
with regard to the right of competent adults to consent to or refuse medical treatment, state
statutes generally are more complicated when the patient is a minor.”).
120. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent
Medical Decision-Making, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 409, 416-27 (2002); Hill, supra note 118, at
42-43.
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States may require minors to obtain parental consent prior to
obtaining an abortion. But states must provide for an alternative
bypass procedure where a neutral third-party must consent to the
abortion upon finding either that (1) the minor is sufficiently mature
and informed to make the decision independently or (2) an abortion
would be in her best interests.121 Generally, emancipated minors and
minors determined on an individualized basis to possess adequate
maturity (pursuant to what is known as the “mature minor” doctrine)
may also make their own medical decisions.122

C.

Exceptions to the Age of Majority

A survey of just a number of the legal exceptions to the
presumptive age of majority, like the one that follows, leads to two
conclusions about the age of majority itself. First, the proliferation of
exceptions to it demonstrates that the age of majority insufficiently
meets current social needs. That the exceptions alter legal
consequences for individuals variously past the age of majority and
those who have not yet attained it, moreover, suggests that perhaps no
categorical age of majority can adequately meet social needs.
Second, the existence of exceptions that apply in specific legal
contexts demonstrates that it is not unduly burdensome for lawmakers
to engage in this sort of context-specific rulemaking. Stated
differently, categorical rules like the age of majority serve useful
purposes by eliminating uncertainty and advancing efficiency. Yet
lawmaking that impacts young people has already begun to alter in
order to better address, in comparison to the presumptive age of
majority, the needs of society and capacities or incapacities of young
people.

121. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-76 (1976). For a cogent analysis of these cases that
concludes that they fail to meaningfully expand children’s broader claims to constitutional
rights, see Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 589 (2002).
122. Andrew Newman, Adolescent Consent to Routine Medical and Surgical
Treatment, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 501, 504-08 (2001) (discussing and critiquing exceptions
applied to emancipated and “mature” minors and arguing in favor of a bright-line rule
allowing all individuals over age sixteen to make medical decisions).
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Contract Rights, Labor Market Participation, and the Right to
Medical and Procreative Choice (Redux)

Young people do not formally acquire the rights to contract, fully
participate in the labor market, or independently make medical and
procreative choices until reaching the age of legal majority. However,
as previously discussed, exceptions to each of these rules allow
minors to engage regularly in these activities prior to attaining
majority.123 In each of these contexts, the exceptions better describe
the reality of young people’s experiences—and the needs of society—
than does the presumptive rule.
2.

Giving Sexual Consent

Every state has established a minimum age at which individuals
may consent to sex. Seven states have set the age of sexual consent at
eighteen—the legal age of majority in those states. The remainder
have set the age of consent below the age of majority.124 The most
common age adopted by states is sixteen, while four states have set
the age of sexual consent at age fourteen.125
Although sexual consent laws on occasion lead to the criminal
prosecution of teenagers who engage in consensual sex, states have
generally revised their laws so that only individuals who are
significantly older than the minor below the age of consent are subject
to prosecution.126 Historically, statutory rape laws aimed to protect
women and restrict their sexual activity.127 Today, the age of sexual
consent and statutory rape laws that rely on the age differential
between the victim and perpetrator reflect pragmatic responses to the
prevalence of teenage sexual activity. Indeed, nearly half of all high
school students surveyed in 2009 reported having engaged in sexual
intercourse.128

123. See discussion supra subpart I.B.
124. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, Sex and the Workplace: “Consenting” Adolescents and
a Conflict of Laws, 79 WASH. L. REV. 471, 486 (2004).
125. Id.; see also Todres, supra note 13, at 1139-41 (discussing state laws on age of
consent).
126. Asaph Glosser et al., Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and Reporting
Requirements, DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, ES-1, 6 tbl.1, 6-8 (2004), http://aspe.hhs.
gov/hsp/08/SR/StateLaws/report.pdf.
127. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63
TEX. L. REV. 387, 401-02 (1984).
128. Danice K. Eaton et al., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance—United States, 2009,
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., June 2010, at 98 tbl.61.
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The Right To Drive

Although car crashes kill more teens than any other cause, the
United States grants drivers’ licenses earlier than any other nation in
the developed world.129 Every state issues licenses to individuals
younger than eighteen, with most states setting the age of licensure at
sixteen.130 A few states set the driving age at fourteen or fifteen, and
only one—New Jersey—has set it higher, at age seventeen.131
The youngest drivers crash at the highest rates. Crash rates are
consistently highest among sixteen-year-olds and decline substantially
with each year of increasing age.132 Younger novice drivers have
significantly higher crash rates than do older novices.133 This evidence
has led most states to adopt graduated licensing systems which permit
novice drivers to gain experience but impose on them restrictions (e.g.,
passenger limits and night-time driving restrictions) aimed at reducing
their exposure to hazardous driving contexts.134
4.

The Right To Purchase, Possess, and Consume Alcohol

Congress conditioned states’ receipt of federal highway funds on
their imposing a drinking age of twenty-one.135 In light of high rates
of alcohol-related injuries and death, many states readily raised their
drinking ages.136 Some lawmakers argued against what they viewed as
inconsistent and unfair treatment of young people eighteen and older.
They reasoned that young people who were subject to the draft and
permitted to enlist voluntarily in the armed services ought not be
denied the adult right to consume alcohol.137 While arguments against
raising the drinking age above states’ ages of majority failed, some

129. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Liberty Without Capacity: Why States Should Ban
Adolescent Driving, 48 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2014) [hereinafter Hamilton, Liberty Without
Capacity].
130. Id. at 1021.
131. Id. at 1034.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1029-30.
134. Id. at 1031.
135. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding
statute as a valid exercise of Congressional spending power).
136. Michael P. Rosenthal, The Minimum Drinking Age for Young People: An
Observation, 92 DICK. L. REV. 649, 653-54 (1988).
137. See Cunningham, supra note 54, at 298 (discussing debate and defeat of bill
sponsored by Wisconsin state legislator to lower the drinking age for service members to
nineteen).
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scholars have suggested that the psychological research on adolescent
and emerging adult capacity supports lowering the drinking age.138
5.

Continued Entitlement to Parental Support and Benefits

The Dependent Coverage Mandate of the ACA expanded the
availability of health insurance for young adults by allowing those
aged nineteen to twenty-six to remain covered as dependents under
their parents’ plans.139 Minors have long received medical coverage
through their parents’ employer-provided health plans.140 After age
eighteen or graduating from college, however, minors were
reclassified as adults and lost their dependent status, along with the
derivative health benefits that attended it.141 These young adults
obtained health coverage only with difficulty, if at all.142 One in three
young adults aged nineteen to twenty-five had no health insurance in
2010.143 The effect of the Dependent Coverage Mandate was dramatic,
and parents rushed to add their adult children to their health plans.144
By the end of 2011, parents had extended health insurance to 6.6
million young adults who had been ineligible for such coverage
before the ACA’s passage.145
138. See id. at 297.
139. Sara R. Collins et al., Young, Uninsured, and in Debt: Why Young Adults Lack
Health Insurance and How the Affordable Care Act Is Helping, COMMONWEALTH FUND 2
(June 2012), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/
2012/Jun/1604_collins_young_uninsured_in_debt_v4.pdf [hereinafter Collins et al., Why
Young Adults Lack Health Insurance].
140. Id. at 3. Children who receive health coverage through Medicaid or the
Children’s Health Insurance Program are reclassified as adults on their nineteenth birthdays
and, with the exceptions of pregnant women or parents of children with very low incomes,
also lose their health coverage. Id. at 1.
141. Id. at 15 n.4.
142. Sara R. Collins et al., Realizing Health Reform’s Potential: How the Affordable
Care Act Is Helping Young Adults Stay Covered, COMMONWEALTH FUND 1 (May 2011),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2011/may/1508_
collins_how_aca_is_helping_young_adults_reform_brief_v5_corrected.pdf [hereinafter
Collins et al., Realizing Health Reform’s Potential].
143. Robin A. Cohen & Michael E. Martinez, Health Insurance Coverage: Early
Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, January–March 2011, CDC
(Sept. 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201109.pdf (finding 33.9%
of nineteen- to twenty-five-year-olds to be uninsured in 2010); Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al.,
Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2011, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Sept. 2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf (finding 29.8% of
nineteen- to twenty-five-year-olds to be uninsured in 2010).
144. Collins et al., Realizing Health Reform’s Potential, supra note 142, at 1.
145. Cohen & Martinez, supra note 143; see also Yaa Akosa Antwi et al., Effects of

Federal Policy To Insure Young Adults: Evidence from the 2010 Affordable Care Act
Dependent Coverage Mandate, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18200,
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The Dependent Coverage Mandate extends to a wide swath of
legal adults a benefit long associated with minor and dependent status.
Its very title signals that this cohort of legal adults commonly remains
reliant on others in significant respects. As such, they lack the
independence that is one of the characteristic markers of adulthood,
despite having formally attained that legal status.
III. ADULTHOOD DEINSTITUTIONALIZED
This Part discusses the nature of the transition to adulthood,
which is not at all fixed nor definite.146 It is instead variable, not only
with respect to its timing (whether it occurs earlier or later in a young
person’s life), but also with respect to its substance (those
characteristics whose attainment mark adult status). Put another way,
changes over time alter the social context in which young people
come of age, which in turn influences both the age at which they
reach adult status and the manner by which they reach it.
Variations in social contexts have gone a long way toward
shaping young people’s transitions to and conceptions of adulthood.
In the United States and other western countries, the transition to
adulthood is both exceptionally unstructured and prolonged. This Part
argues that the nature of the transition has contributed to a modern
conception of adulthood itself as a status achieved only gradually and
not dependent on the attainment of specific external events, such as
marriage or the completion of education.147 Part IV will discuss the
policy implications of the historical developments discussed in this
Part.

A. Structural Influences on the Transition to Adulthood
Historians of society have identified five significant events that
have, for more than a century, marked the transition from minority to
adulthood for most young Americans.
These have been:
(1) marrying; (2) leaving their parents’ homes; (3) establishing
June 2012) (reporting on the health insurance and labor market implications of the recent
Affordable Care Act).
146. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: Understanding the New Way of
Coming of Age, in EMERGING ADULTS IN AMERICA: COMING OF AGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3,
4 (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Jennifer Lynn Tanner eds., 2006) [hereinafter Arnett,
Understanding the New Way of Coming of Age] (“The timing and meaning of . . . reaching
full adult status [] is different today than it was 50 or 100 years ago . . . .”).
147. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Suffering, Selfish, Slackers? Myths and Reality About
Emerging Adults, 36 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 23, 25 (2007); see also infra subpart III.B
(discussing the socio-cultural conceptions of modern adulthood).
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households of their own; (4) completing their educations or leaving
school; and (5) entering the workforce.148 While a minority of the
young population has always taken other paths to adulthood (e.g.,
never marrying or remaining resident with their parents), the
dominance of this five-part pathway to adulthood has made it the
modern “bedrock of social organization,” channeling most Americans
onto “paths to a narrowly conceived adulthood.”149
Most young Americans thus experienced each of the five
transition events along the course to adulthood. The timing of the
events and the order in which they have tended to occur, however,
have varied in important ways over time. 150 A whole range of
interrelated social contexts have influenced these variations, with
structural changes having particular salience for young people coming
of age in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Scholars now
characterize the transition to adulthood during this period of roughly
one hundred years, not as a continuous evolution or trend, but as
separable into three discrete but related eras.
The first era spans 1900 to 1950. During this period, young
people both discontinued their educations and entered the workforce
at early ages—in their teen years.151 Although employed full-time,
they nonetheless tended to remain in their parents’ households,
delaying marriage. Because the wages earned by young people were
relatively low, full-time employment generally provided insufficient
income to enable them immediately to set up independent
households. 152 Instead, young people continued to rely on the
financial and residential security of their parents’ households for a
number of years following their entry into the paid workforce.153
Parents, in turn, relied on their children’s labor and earnings, their own
economic instability due largely to across-the-board job insecurity and
the exclusion of married women from the workplace.154
The socio-economic context of this first period of the twentieth
century contributed to an extended period of intergenerational
interdependence. Young people did not complete the five-part
148. John Modell et al., Social Change and Transitions to Adulthood in Historical
Perspective, 1 J. FAM. HIST. 7 (1976).
149. Jordan Stanger-Ross et al., Falling Far from the Tree: Transitions to Adulthood
and the Social History of Twentieth-Century America, 29 SOC. SCI. HIST. 625, 626 (2005).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 638.
154. Id.
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transition to adulthood—which would include moving from their
parents’ households into their own and marrying—until relatively late
in life.155
The nature of young people’s transition to adulthood changed
during a distinct second era, extending from approximately 1950 into
the 1970s. Significant changes in the institutional and economic
context that characterized this period prompted equally significant
changes in the transition to adulthood. Wartime and postwar
industrialization and the introduction of government social programs
together contributed to a period of unprecedented economic
prosperity in the decades that followed.156
Government programs introduced during this era included Social
Security and old-age pensions, which lessened older Americans’
reliance on their children’s wages.157 New Deal programs guaranteeing
private investments facilitated individual and family saving. Other
programs underwrote and made loans to homeowners, making home
ownership more readily available to younger buyers.158
The military needs brought on by the nation’s involvement in
World War II provided abundant job opportunities for service
members themselves and for those away from the battlefields whose
labor was needed to support the war effort. 159 Manufacturing
accelerated during the war, and postwar industrialization ushered in an
era of unprecedented economic opportunity.160 Jobs in manufacturing
generally required neither formal education nor high levels of skill,
encouraging young people to enter the workforce at younger ages.
Only one in three adults took the time to complete high school during
this period, and one in sixteen completed college.161 Industries’ need
for laborers in the postwar economy nonetheless led to continued job
opportunities and increasing wages, particularly for young men.162
Three factors in particular contributed to young people’s leaving
their parents’ homes and marrying at ages younger than at any time in
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 626.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 639.
Id.
Id.

Catherine A. Fitch & Steven Ruggles, Historical Trends in Marriage Formation:
THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND
COHABITATION 59, 65 (Linda J. Waite et al. eds., 2000).
161. Percent of People 25 Years and Over Who Have Completed High School or
College, by Race, Hispanic Origin and Sex: Selected Years 1940 to 2004, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, tbl.A-2 (Mar. 2005), www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/tabA-2.pdf.
162. Stanger-Ross et al., supra note 149, at 640.

The United States 1850-1990, in THE TIES
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the nation’s history: (1) their ability to earn high wages at young ages;
(2) the implementation of government programs that supported
homeownership; and (3) government-provided support for higher
education, particularly for former service members.163
This midcentury era of early and rapid transition to adulthood
and family life where men’s labor paid them a wage sufficient to
support a family represented an historical aberration, not a new
norm. 164 Nonetheless, just as the “single-earner, breadwinnerhomemaker marriage” of the 1950s became entrenched in the
collective memory as the “traditional” family,165 it is possible that
shifts in the timing of these transitions that occurred during this period
became entrenched as the normative transition to adulthood. If so,
adoption of this conception, in which young people became capable
of establishing households, marrying, and gaining financial
independence by their late teens, may help explain the readiness with
which Americans accepted the across-the-board lowering of the legal
age of majority that occurred shortly after this historical period.
The third era, which continues today, began in the 1970s. By the
end of that decade, the decline of industry made low-skilled
manufacturing jobs scarce. Moreover, well-paying jobs in what was
becoming a service- and technology-based postindustrial economy
increasingly required higher levels of formal education.166 College
enrollment increased in the immediate aftermath of the Great
Recession, which led to more young adults remaining in (or returning
to) their parents’ households.167 Employment and relative earning for
young men declined, with wages in particular falling significantly
from 2000 to 2010.168
Many of the jobs in the modern economy pay less than the
manufacturing jobs of the twentieth century.169 The best of these jobs
also require higher education.170 According to one report, two-thirds

163. Id. at 640-41; Michael R. Haines, Long Term Marriage Patterns in the United
States from Colonial Times to the Present 35-36 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Historical
Paper No. 80, 1996).
164. Stanger-Ross et al., supra note 149, at 627.
165. Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 848, 851 (2004).
166. Stanger-Ross et al., supra note 149, at 642-43.
167. Fry, supra note 10, at 6.
168. Id.
169. JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, EMERGING ADULTHOOD: THE WINDING ROAD FROM THE
LATE TEENS THROUGH THE TWENTIES 145 (2004) [hereinafter ARNETT, THE WINDING ROAD].
170. Id.
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of high-growth, high-wage jobs require employees to have a college
degree.171
Individuals thus began spending more years gaining higher
levels of education and participating in the workforce, both to finance
their educations and to build financial resources for their future
needs.172 While engaged in these activities, they delayed marriage and
forming households of their own. Instead, they tended to spend this
protracted period of the transition to adulthood in relative autonomy,
despite often spending part of the period living in the parents’
households.173 Young people today thus take longer to complete the
five-part transition to adulthood than they did in the past, undertaking
each traditional transition event at a later age than in previous
decades.174
Viewing the “dramatic shifts” in the path to adulthood in the
historical context in which they transpired helps “serve to undermine
a normative understanding of the transition to adulthood and to point,
instead, to its deeply historical dynamics.” 175 Young people’s
conceptions of the transition to adulthood, examined in the following
subpart, emphasize the variable aspects of the pathway to adulthood
and the variable meaning of adulthood itself.

B.

Socio-Cultural Conceptions of Modern Adulthood

Psychologist Jeffrey Arnett conducted a series of studies across
the United States to identify contemporary conceptions of adulthood
among young people themselves.176 The studies found that their
conceptions depart radically from the traditional conception of the
transition to adulthood.
Young people rarely list any of the five transition events (i.e.,
marrying, leaving parents’ homes, establishing independent
households, completing educations or leaving school, and entering the
workforce) that have long defined the attainment of adult status.
171. John M. Bridgeland et al., Raising the Compulsory School Attendance Age: The
Case for Reform, CIVIC ENTERPRISES (2007), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED503356.pdf.
172. Stanger-Ross et al., supra note 149, at 643. Andrew Cherlin characterized the
1950s, during which individuals married young and families could live comfortably on the
wages of one spouse, as “the most unusual time for family life in the past century.” ANDREW
J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN
AMERICA TODAY 6 (2009).
173. Stanger-Ross et al., supra note 149, at 643-44.
174. Id. at 645.
175. Id.
176. ARNETT, THE WINDING ROAD, supra note 169, at 14-15; Arnett, Understanding
the New Way of Coming of Age, supra note 146, at 12.
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Instead, researchers have consistently found that individuals perceive
the most significant markers of adulthood to be: (1) accepting
responsibility for oneself; (2) making independent decisions; and
(3) attaining financial independence.177
For the young people who participated in the studies, accepting
responsibility for oneself connotes shouldering the responsibilities
previously assumed by parents rather than expecting parents to deal
with the consequences of one’s actions. 178 Independent decision
making to them connotes making important life decisions oneself,
outside the influence of one’s parents. 179 And to be financially
independent means no longer relying on one’s parents to pay one’s
bills.180
Researchers in other industrialized countries have conducted
similar studies, and results have been remarkably uniform across
regions as well as across ethnic and socio-economic groups.181 These
results hold even in regions with culturally or religiously significant
coming-of-age milestones.182 In the Jewish tradition, for example, the
bar mitzvah has long marked the adolescent boy’s transition to
adulthood and his assumption of the religious obligations of adult
Jewish males. 183 Similarly, in Latin cultures, the quinceañera
celebration marks the adolescent girl’s transition to adulthood.184 Yet
studies conducted in Israel and Argentina, where each ceremony is
celebrated almost universally, revealed that while these ceremonial
milestones might be significant cultural and religious events, they are
not significant markers of adulthood.185 Instead, individuals in these
cultures, as in other industrialized regions where researchers
conducted similar studies, view the three responsibility- and
independence-related criteria as the more meaningful markers of adult
status.186
177. See sources cited supra note 176.
178. ARNETT, THE WINDING ROAD, supra note 169, at 48.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Arnett, Understanding the New Way of Coming of Age, supra note 146, at 12.
182. See Todres, supra note 13, at 1148-49 (describing coming-of-age ceremonies
across several cultural traditions).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Alicia Facio & Fabiana Micocci, Emerging Adulthood in Argentina, in
EXPLORING CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD 21, 30 (Jeffrey
Jensen Arnett & Nancy L. Galambos eds., 2003); Ofra Mayseless & Miri Scharf, What Does
It Mean to Be an Adult?: The Israeli Experience, in supra, at 5, 15-16.
186. See sources cited supra note 185; see also Larry J. Nelson et al., The Influence of
Culture in Emerging Adulthood: Perspectives of Chinese College Students, 28 INT’L. J. OF
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These findings also point to what appears to be a fundamental
historical shift in two respects. First, in cultures across the globe, and
for most of American history, marriage has been the singular event
marking the attainment of full adult status.187 Marriage continues to
be an important social institution in the United States, but individuals
no longer rank marriage as necessary, or even important, in making
the transition to adulthood. It is losing—or has perhaps already lost—
its historical primacy as a marker of adult status.188
Second, as Arnett explains, individuals achieve each of the three
markers gradually rather than experiencing them as the transition
events previously discussed—in other words, as “milestones that take
place at a specific time and that a person clearly either has or has not
reached,” such as getting married or completing education.189 This
absence of readily identifiable markers may contribute to what young
people who have attained the age of legal majority consistently report
with respect to their status: Despite having formally reached legal
adult status, young people in the process of developing what they
perceive to be the markers of adulthood report that they do not
consider themselves adults. Instead, they feel as though they occupy a
status somewhere between adolescence and full adulthood.190
Arnett has termed this in-between period “emerging adulthood,”
which he characterizes as a distinct developmental period spanning
approximately ages eighteen to twenty-five.191 He emphasizes that it
is a status largely experienced by young people in wealthier,
developed nations rather than a universal stage of development.
Nonetheless, his theory of emerging adulthood finds additional
empirical support in the developmental sciences. The following
subpart turns to the developmental aspects of the transition to
adulthood.

BEHAV. DEV. 26 (2004) (finding that most Chinese college students feel that adulthood is
indicated by successful acceptance of responsibilities rather than traditional markers of
transition such as marriage).
187. Anthropologists and historians of American society both identify marriage as
having long served this social function. See, e.g., JOSEPH F. KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE:
ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE PRESENT 247 (1977); ALICE SCHLEGEL & HERBERT
BARRY III, ADOLESCENCE: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL INQUIRY 92-93 (1991).
188. ARNETT, THE WINDING ROAD, supra note 169, at 208.
189. Arnett, Understanding the New Way of Coming of Age, supra note 146, at 12.
190. Id.
191. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the
Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 469 (2000).
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Cognitive and Socio-Emotional Development from Adolescence
Through Emerging and Early Adulthood

The state’s use of a categorical age of majority represents a
rough judgment about the development of maturity and competence.192
This subpart briefly surveys aspects of individual development that
may bear on our understanding of that development and the course of
young people’s attainment of various capabilities. It begins with the
development of general cognitive capacity over the course of
adolescence, defined by researchers as the developmental period
(rather than a period defined strictly by chronological age) following
childhood and spanning approximately ages twelve to seventeen.193
General cognitive capacity includes the abilities to understand
and logically reason from facts, process information, and assess the
nature of a given situation.194 These basic cognitive abilities improve
more or less linearly throughout childhood and reach mature levels by
midadolescence—approximately age sixteen. 195 Researchers have
concluded that the reasoning and basic information-processing
capacities of the typical sixteen-year-old are “essentially
indistinguishable” from those of adults.196
However, not all cognitive processes mature by midadolescence.
Some processes, including certain aspects of working memory,
continue to specialize and develop into adulthood, maturing only in
the early twenties.197 Working memory is involved in a number of
complex mental abilities, including the ability to filter irrelevant
information and suppress inappropriate actions.198
Studies have confirmed adolescents’ competence to make
rational decisions, but the contexts in which adolescents make
decisions can drastically affect the quality of their decision making.199
192. Scott, supra note 2, at 559-60.
193. Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and
Cognitive Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 212 (2009).
194. Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 590-92 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Less Mature Than Adults?].
195. Id.; Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent RiskTaking, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78, 80 (2008) [hereinafter Steinberg, Adolescent RiskTaking].
196. Steinberg et al., Less Mature Than Adults?, supra note 194, at 592.
197. Beatriz Luna et al., What Has fMRI Told Us About the Development of
Cognitive Control Through Adolescence?, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 101, 105 (2010).
198. Id. at 101.
199. Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk
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When adolescents make decisions in contexts involving stressors that
require them to exercise psychosocial maturity and regulatory
competence—for example, “[i]n the heat of passion, . . . on the spur
of the moment, in unfamiliar situations, . . . and when behavioral
inhibition is required”—their decision making suffers.200 Researchers
have come to refer to this phenomenon as the “competenceperformance distinction.”201
Researchers have also found adolescents to be as
“knowledgeable, logical, reality-based, and accurate in the ways in
which they think about risky activity . . . as their elders.”202 When
making decisions about risk, adolescents’ decision-making process
does differ in significant respects from that of adults. Compared to
adults, for example, adolescents tend to weigh and value benefits
more heavily than they do risks.203 This tendency alone, though,
seems inadequate to explain what are typical characteristics of
adolescent behavior—impulsivity, risk taking, and sensation
seeking.204
Developmental neuroscientists, aided by technological
developments over the last decade that allow them to observe the
brain as it performs different tasks, now posit that the development of
neural systems along different timelines can help explain adolescent
risk taking and poor decision making despite adolescents’ apparent
cognitive abilities, as well as other aspects of adolescent behavior.205
The first neural system, referred to as the socio-emotional
system, involves social-information-processing and reward seeking
and processing.206 Activity in neural reward systems peaks rapidly
Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 625 (2005); Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley,
Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and
Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1, 2, 11 (2006); Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking,
supra note 195.
200. Reyna & Farley, supra note 199, at 12.
201. Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Studying
Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 220 (1996).
202. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 195.
203. See Fischhoff, supra note 22, at 19-20; Geier & Luna, supra note 193, at 213.
204. Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and
Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH
216, 218 (2009); Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 195, at 79.
205. Stephanie Burnett et al., The Social Brain in Adolescence: Evidence from
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Behavioural Studies, 35 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 1654, 1660 (2011); B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 1124
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 111, 111-15 (2008).
206. Geier & Luna, supra note 193, at 216-17; see Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking,
supra note 195, at 83. The socio-emotional system includes “the amygdala, nucleus
accumbens, orbitofrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and superior temporal sulcus.” Id.
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around the time of pubertal maturation (in early adolescence) and then
declines.207 It is this peak in activity, neuroscientists believe, that leads
to heightened reward salience—that is, adolescents experience
rewarding stimuli as even more rewarding than during either
childhood or adulthood. This helps explain adolescent sensationseeking behaviors in which they seek out new and highly stimulating
experiences and willingly taking risks in order to attain them.208
The system referred to as the cognitive control system, involving
abilities to intentionally coordinate and engage in goal-directed
behavior, follows a different developmental trajectory.
Its
development is more gradual and linear than that of the socioemotional system.209 Along with other structural changes in the brain,
this developmental trajectory correlates with the steady improvement
of basic cognitive processes into adolescence, with the maturation of
basic cognitive processes largely complete by midadolescence.210
In sum, adolescents’ basic cognitive abilities mature by age
sixteen and give them the capacity to learn, process information,
reason, and make rational decisions. Self-regulatory capacities
continue to develop, however, making adolescents susceptible to the
confounding influence of their heightened sensitivity to reward.211
This heightened sensitivity, which peaks around midadolescence,
inclines adolescents towards sensation seeking, risk taking, and
impulsivity.212 Self-regulatory immaturity can dominate or overwhelm

207. Geier & Luna, supra note 193, at 216-17. For a technical discussion of this
aspect of brain development, see CHARLES A. NELSON ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE OF COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF EXPERIENCE AND THE DEVELOPING BRAIN 24 (2006).
208. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 195, at 85.
209. Id. at 93. For technical discussions of these developmental processes, see Nitin
Gogtay & Paul M. Thompson, Mapping Gray Matter Development: Implications for Typical
Development and Vulnerability to Psychopathology, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 6, 7 (2010);
Tomáš Paus, Mapping Brain Maturation and Cognitive Development During Adolescence, 9
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 60, 62 (2005); and Arthur W. Toga et al., Mapping Brain
Maturation, 29 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCES 148, 149-50 (2006).
210. Luna et al., supra note 197, at 101; Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra
note 195, at 93-94. The system includes the prefrontal cortex (involved in executive,
decision-making, and self-regulatory functions), “association” areas (which connect different
regions of the brain and support the complex integration of functions), and parts of the corpus
callosum (which connects the left and right hemispheres of the brain). Beatriz Luna,
Developmental Changes in Cognitive Control Through Adolescence, in ADVANCES IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 233, 240 (Patricia Bauer ed., 2009); Luna et al., supra note
197, at 101; Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 195, at 93-94.
211. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 195, at 83.
212. Id. at 89.
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cognitive processes and drive adolescent behaviors, particularly in
high-pressure contexts and those triggering heightened emotion.213
Brain development continues well into the mid-twenties.
Advanced cognitive capacities, including higher-order and executive
functions such as strategic planning, continue to improve linearly
through late adolescence and early adulthood.214 These improvements
correlate with structural changes that increase connections within and
between different regions of the brain.215
Improved coordination of affect (the external expression of
emotions) and cognition correlates with increased connectivity
between regions of the brain involved in social and emotional
information processing and those involved in cognitive processes.216
Thus emotional regulation and impulse control both improve through
adolescence and into the mid-twenties. The continuation of
developmental processes into the postadolescent period provides
some neurobiological support that buttresses the behavioral case for
categorizing “emerging adulthood” as a distinct period of
development.217
IV. DISMANTLING THE CATEGORICAL AGE OF MAJORITY
Part II demonstrated that the categorical age of majority fails to
comport with the legal reality created by a host of rules whose
adoption has imposed a growing number of exceptions to its
presumptive operation. Part III demonstrated that young people’s
transition to adulthood, subjective construction of the transition to
adulthood, and individual developmental processes all contemplate a
gradual and prolonged process comprising the acquisition of general
capabilities—not the achievement of externally constructed events.
These capabilities, moreover, vary across contexts. Thus young
people tend to attain the capacity for financial independence relatively
late in life but attain the capacity for making informed and rational
decisions about their own medical care relatively early in life.
Informed by the preceding Parts, this Part contends that the
exceptions to the presumptive age of majority better address the needs
213. Luna, supra note 210, at 257; Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 195,
at 96-98.
214. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 195, at 94-96. These include
response inhibition, planning, and spatial working memory. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, ADOLESCENCE AND EMERGING ADULTHOOD: A
CULTURAL APPROACH 14 (5th ed. 2013).
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of society and young people alike. It argues for the explicit adoption
of a “rule comprising exceptions”—in other words, for the
abandonment altogether of the presumptive age of legal majority in
favor of context-specific rules. The state’s commitment to individual
liberty supports such an approach because it extends to individuals
those rights which they have attained the capacity to exercise.
This Part also argues that other commitments, namely
commitments to community, mitigate against the retention of
adulthood as a categorical legal status. Finally, it provides guidance to
lawmakers seeking to assess capacity in certain contexts, offering
insights from behavioral decision research, and proposes the adoption
of a number of policy measures consistent with the policymaking
approach advanced here. The subparts that follow elaborate these
arguments.

A. Context-Specific Competence
Young people reliably attain different capabilities at distinct
stages of development.218 Accordingly, across a range of policymaking
contexts, a categorical rule will fail to take account either of contextspecific capacities or of ongoing deficiencies. This subpart first
argues that the core commitments of the liberal democratic state
require it to account for context-specific capabilities.219 It next argues
that the state’s commitment to community (in tension with individual
liberty but important nonetheless) provides further support for
jettisoning adulthood as status.
1.

Individual Competence and Core Commitments of the Liberal
Democratic State

Individual liberty is the core value of the liberal constitutional
democratic state, and safeguarding its citizens’ liberty is therefore the
state’s primary end.220 The minimum entitlement of all citizens is the
basic liberty to decide one’s life course for oneself, and it is the state’s
218. See discussion supra subpart III.C.
219. Behavioral scientists have posited one definition of context as “a culturally
defined situation that (a) occurs in a particular time and place and (b) contains actors who
perform culturally defined roles.” James P. Byrnes, The Development of Self-Regulated
Decision Making, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING IN CHILDREN
AND ADOLESCENTS 5, 7 (Janis E. Jacobs & Paul A. Klaczynski eds., 2005).
220. I elaborate these arguments and settle on a version of liberty embraced by certain
liberal theorists in Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV.
1055, 1068-74 [hereinafter Hamilton, Immature Citizens].
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duty to guarantee it.221 Those individuals whose capabilities in some
respect remain immature have two basic categories of interests that
the state should take account of in its decision making: welfare
interests and autonomy interests.222 Their welfare interests pertain to
their well-being, irrespective of any affirmative choice they make,
including an interest in being protected from their own deficiencies.
Their autonomy-related interests pertain to their exercising those
specific liberties of which they are capable.223
Simply put, lawmakers should work to become more cognizant
of and responsive to young people’s capacities and extend to them
age- and context-specific liberties to make the self-regarding
decisions of which they are capable.224 This decision-making process
can indeed be a complex one, although the developmental and
behavioral sciences can (and ought to) supplement the more
traditional policymaking considerations. The following subpart
briefly discusses the assessment of context-specific capacity—a task
which necessarily retains some level of imprecision.
Respected scholars, including Professor Elizabeth Scott, have
argued against abandoning the age of majority as a categorical rule.225
Scott reasons that, although like all categorical rules it includes some
level of imprecision, the age of majority serves society’s purposes
relatively well by advancing the goals of certainty and administrative
efficiency.226 Moreover, to the extent it underestimates young persons’
capacities in certain legal contexts (such as the minors’ competence to
execute contracts) and delays their ability to exercise certain rights,
the harms are generally slight, and temporary.227
Although I agree with Scott’s identification of the costs and
benefits of the categorical rule, I would weigh them differently.
Existing law, rife with exceptions to the age of majority, demonstrates
221. Id. at 1074.
222. Id. at 1095.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1128. For a discussion of children’s status as rights holders separate from
their possessing any specific capacity, see JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN 291-307 (2006).
225. See Scott, supra note 2 (arguing in favor of recognizing the legal status of
adolescence in the juvenile justice context but retaining the presumptive age of majority in
other contexts where it currently applies).
226. See, e.g., id. at 560 (“The use of a [categorical age of majority] to designate the
end of childhood ignores individual variations in developmental maturity as well as varying
maturity demands across the range of legal rights and responsibilities. Nonetheless, it
generally functions quite well.”).
227. Id.
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that context-specific decision-making poses no undue burden on
lawmakers. The argument that failure to extend liberties despite
individual capacity imposes minimal harm elides the primacy of the
state’s obligation to individual liberty. Where capacity exists, the
justification for denying that liberty (or vesting it in a parent or
guardian) disappears. Further, with respect to certain rights, delay
itself can constitute denial. For example, the sixteen-year-old who
would refuse surgery to correct a nonfatal congenital defect will be
denied the right to do so if her parents consent to the procedure. For
the young patient, acquiring the right to make her own medical
decisions after reaching majority provides no relief from the earlier
denial of that right.
2.

Adult Status, Autonomy, and Relationship

As discussed above, young people in today’s developed nations
identify as markers of adulthood: (1) accepting responsibility for
oneself; (2) making independent decisions; and (3) attaining financial
independence. 228 At one level, this construction of adulthood is
altogether unobjectionable. Most parents, after all, work to raise their
children to be responsible, financially independent adults.
At another level, this conception of adulthood is deeply troubling.
Conspicuously absent from it are notions of obligation to community
or family, or indeed any recognition of the role of ongoing connection
and interdependence.229 The current conception of adulthood instead
emphasizes as normative the attainment of individual autonomy and
independence. The absence of notions of community is particularly
notable in light of the growing importance of ongoing familial
support to young people coming of age today.
As discussed above, contemporary young people travel a
prolonged path to independence, particularly financial independence.
Many young people continue to be at least partially dependent on and
tied to their natal families well past the legal age of adulthood.230 In
2014 more adults aged eighteen to thirty-four lived with parents than
228. See discussion supra subpart III.B.
229. Feminists have drawn attention to the ways in which notions of autonomy and
individuality have operated to reinforce traditionally hierarchical relationships and minimized
relationships and interdependencies. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004); Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road
to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 983, 1017-19 (1993).
230. See, e.g., Stanger-Ross et al., supra note 149, at 643-44.
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with a spouse or partner in their own household, and the trend
continues to increase.231
To the extent it expresses a societal expectation or norm of
across-the-board independence (decisional, financial, etc.), the current
conception of adulthood is out of step with the experiences of today’s
young people. To the extent that the law conveys a normative
expectation that they are adults and thus ought to possess adult
characteristics, their inability to have done so by the legally prescribed
age may be both experienced and perceived as failure.
Not attaining the characteristics of adulthood by the legal age of
majority, however, merely reflects the particular social context—
including the economic context—in which they are coming of age.
The state’s affirmative duty to take action for the purpose of
expressing the importance of connection and interdependence is
arguably quite limited. But doing so presents lawmakers with what
seems a rare opportunity to advance individual liberty (by rejecting
the categorical rule in favor of rules more tailored to individual
capacities) while also expressing the importance of relationships and
community.

B.

Assessing Capacity: Lessons from Existing Law and Science

Categorical rules like an age of legal majority advance goals of
administrative efficiency and certainty. 232 The existence of a
categorical rule spares the decision maker in a given case the task of
making burdensome (and likely unreliable) individualized
assessments of capacity. Yet as argued above, lawmakers in the liberal
state have a duty to assess the capacities of immature citizens in legal
contexts.233
In any given context, the interplay of various factors will
influence capacity. It is possible to characterize age-related capacity
as a function of: (1) patterns of cognitive and socio-emotional
development; (2) the nature of the capacity being exercised (e.g.,
characteristics of the task to be performed or the decision to be made);
(3) the context in which the capacity will be exercised; and (4) the
broader social, cultural, and economic milieu.
The interrelationship of factors in these categories shapes in
predictable ways the typical individual’s capacity, for example, to
231. See Fry, supra note 10.
232. Scott, supra note 2, at 560.
233. Hamilton, Immature Citizens, supra note 220, at 1095.
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make a decision in a certain context or perform a given task.
Identifying and accounting for the relevant aspects of these influences
on the exercise of capacity can significantly improve policymakers’
predictive power.
What, if anything, can brain science contribute to lawmaking or
policymaking? It is now well known that the developmental sciences
have shed light on aspects of child and adolescent behavior that has
important policymaking implications.234 The most widely touted of
these has been lawmaking in the area of juvenile justice.235 Casual
observation can—and has—led to erroneous generalizations about
behavior. These mistaken generalizations in turn have led to
misguided policymaking. For example, adolescent impulsivity and
susceptibility to peer pressure in certain situations have led to the
conclusion that they lack the capacity to make reliably mature voting
decisions in elections or medical decisions in a doctor’s office.236
Conversely, adolescents’ ability to learn the mechanics of motor
vehicle operation has led to the conclusion that they have the capacity
to operate them competently.237 Both conclusions are wrong, and
insights from the psychological and neurological sciences help
explain why.

C.

Reconciling Law, Culture, and Capacity: An Example

One of the central tensions between social and legal adulthood
is that individuals are likely to attain fundamental decision-making
capacities before they can realistically attain financial stability and
self-sufficiency.238 Yet a near universal consequence of reaching the
age of majority is distentitlement to parental support. Indeed, for
many young people approaching the age of majority, perhaps one of
the most significant changes attending their new status (especially,
234. See Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development
Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 740 (2009) (“[W]e know a good deal
about brain development during adolescence that usefully informs policy discussions . . . .”);

cf. Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 95 (2009) (“[L]egal decisionmakers acting in a policymaking
role—usually legislatures but sometimes the courts—therefore ought to consider
developmental neuroscience one source among many upon which to draw when making
legally relevant assumptions about adolescents as a group. To go further is unwarranted and
unwise.”).
235. See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE
JUSTICE (2008).
236. See Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, supra note 47, at 1447.
237. See Hamilton, Liberty Without Capacity, supra note 129.
238. See discussion supra subparts II.A. & II.C.
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perhaps, for individuals who have a parent who may be grudgingly
subject to an order of support) is the expiration of parents’ obligation
to provide them with support.
As discussed above, it was against a background of economic
prosperity that states, upon lowering the ages of conscription and
voting, also lowered the age of majority generally. Young people who
had previously been minors until age twenty-one (during a period
when they arguably had less need of its protections until that age)
became adults at eighteen. With that status, they gained the legal
rights of adulthood. At the same time, they lost the right of parental
support and even the special protections afforded minors by the state
through its role as parens patriae.
In the intervening decades since lowering the age of majority,
however, well-paying manufacturing jobs have all but disappeared.
The incomes of workers with a high school degree or less have
declined steeply, and their unemployment rates are particularly high.
The largest share of jobs in the current economy has moved from
manufacturing to the information and services sector, and as
discussed above, the best of these jobs require postsecondary
education. Failing to recognize the importance of supporting young
people as they strive to become the sorts of workers required in
today’s economy disserves them in the short term, and the larger
society in the longer term. State lawmakers should thus seriously
consider raising, perhaps to twenty-one, the age through which
parents are obligated to support their children.
V.

CONCLUSION

Young people’s conception of adulthood, and their experience of
becoming adults, bears little resemblance to the legal construction of
adulthood as status. Although they formally attain adult status upon
reaching the legal age of majority, that formal marker has remarkably
little meaning in young people’s lives. What is now socially
meaningful is the gradual attainment of the various indicia of
adulthood—responsibility for oneself, autonomous decision making,
and financial self-sufficiency.
I have argued in this Article that the categorical age of majority
contravenes a legal reality constructed by the proliferation of
exceptions to it, young people’s social experience and subjective
constructive of the transition to adulthood, and the capacities gained
(and deficiencies retained) over the predictable course of individual
developmental processes. By retaining it, the state fails its foremost
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obligation to safeguard the basic liberties of its citizens. Legal
consequences linked to the age of majority are best amended to attach
to the specific age to which they pertain—whether or not that is the
current age of majority.
I suggest further that the time may have come to jettison not only
adulthood as legal status but also adulthood as social construct.
Doing so presents the state with a rare opportunity to simultaneously
safeguard individual autonomy rights through context-specific
rulemaking and also advance the importance of community
relationships and the interdependencies of citizens, even in liberal
society.

